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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY

The District Court Erred In Denving Relief on Mr. Ciccone's Petition
Mr. Ciccone and the State agree as to the standard of review, the burden of proof, and the
applicability of the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984), deficient
performance and resulting prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel. The parties
disagree as to whether trial counsel determined not to present Dr. Beaver's opinion to the district
court as mitigation in sentencing based on errors of fact and law and on whether, if counsel was
deficient, the deficiency was prejudicial. While the State has made its arguments, the record and
the law, as discussed below, support relief in this case.
B. Mr. Ciccone Established by a Preponderance of the Evidence that Trial
Counsel Acted on the Basis of Factual and Legal Errors
To prevail in post-conviction, Mr. Ciccone was required to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that trial counsel was deficient and that the deficiency was prejudicial. Heilman

v. State, 158 Idaho 139,144,344 P.3d 919,924 (Ct.App. 2015).
Mr. Ciccone carried this burden. He established that trial counsel was deficient in acting
upon the basis of mistakes of fact and law in determining not to present Dr. Beaver's evaluation
to the court as mitigation in sentencing. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,226 P.3d 700 (2009).
And, he established by a preponderance of the evidence a reasonable probability of a different
outcome had counsel not been deficient.
The State disputes this conclusion asserting first that trial counsel was factually correct in
concluding that Dr. Beaver's diagnosis of borderline personality disorder meant that Mr.
Ciccone was abusive and controlling. Respondent's Brief pp. 14-15. To support this argument,

looks to Exhibit 13, pp. 3-8, which is a document trial counsel relied upon. The State
admits that the research docs not use the words "controlling" and "abusive."
Respondent's Brief p. 14. However, the State maintains that the fact that the document "clearly
states that individuals with borderline personality disorder often exhibit" a list of various
characteristics not described with the words "abusive" or "controlling," establishes that trial
counsel was correct in concluding that Mr. Ciccone was controlling and abusive. Id. 1 However,
what is relevant is not what characteristics others "often exhibit." but rather what Dr. Beaver had
to say about Mr. Ciccone. Dr. Beaver may have told trial counsel that Mr. Ciccone had
borderline personality disorder like counsel's first wife did, but it was counsel, not Dr. Beaver,
who concluded that this meant that Mr. Ciccone was controlling and abusive. Counsel testified,
"And [my first wife] was a borderline personality disorder. So it really hit home to me, and
that's why I put 'controlling and abusive.' Tr. 12/12/14 p. 63, In. 16-19. This was a logical leap
that is no more supportable than it would be to say that because one person known to counsel
with depression committed suicide all people with depression are always suicidal. Moreover,
counsel's conclusion was inconsistent with Dr. Beaver's affidavit, which does not state that Mr.
Ciccone is controlling and abusive but does state that there was a significant mental health
component surrounding the deaths of Mr. Ciccone' s wife and unborn child and that had he

The list of characteristics also includes a statement that some with borderline
personality disorder may not feel like they know who they are and may try to be what they think
others want them to be, may have an unusually high degree of interpersonal sensitivity, insight
and empathy, and are often bright, witty, funny, and the life of the party. Exhibit 13, pp. 6-8.
However, the State does not argue that these characteristics mean that Mr. Ciccone is a person
who strives to please others even at the expense of his own personality, who is a man of great
empathy, intelligence and insight, and who is someone people want to be with. Respondent's
Brief.
1

2

prepared a written report for the court it would have assisted in sentencing and very well could
have led to a sentence less than a life sentence. Plaintiff's Ex. B, pp.
The State also argues that trial counsel's decision to forego a written report was based on
Dr. Beaver's opinion that Mr. Ciccone was in deep denial of his culpability. Respondent's Brief
p. 15. However, again, that conclusion is not supported by Dr. Beaver's affidavit, which docs not
state that Mr. Ciccone was afflicted by a deep denial of culpability. Plaintiffs Ex. B. Dr.
Beaver's affidavit does establish by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel acted on the
basis of mistakes of fact.
Further, Mr. Ciccone has established that counsel acted on the basis of mistakes of law.
The first mistake of law was that any written report would have to contain a diagnosis. The State
does not dispute that the statute, I.C. § 19-2522(3)(b), requires a diagnosis, evaluation or
prognosis, not all three. Respondent's Brief p. 15. However, it argues that any written report
that did not include the words "borderline personality disorder" would be incomplete,
misleading, and possibly unethical, requiring Dr. Beaver to "conspire" in wrongdoing.
Respondent's Briefp. 16. But, that argument is just wrong. Dr. Beaver could have written a
report that gave an evaluation of Mr. Ciccone's condition and his prognosis and fully explained
all relevant information in an honest, straightforward, and complete way without using a
diagnostic term which might have invoked prejudice and wrong conclusions from the court, just
as it did from trial counsel.
Mr. Ciccone also established that trial counsel acted on a second mistake of law

that

had he obtained a written evaluation of Mr. Ciccone he would have exposed his client to the risk
of an evaluation with Dr. Estess. The State cites part of I.C. § i 8-207 to argue that had trial

obtained a written evaluation, he could not have avoided an evaluation by Dr Estess if
had so ordered. Respondent's Brief pp. 16-18. However, even though LC. § 18-

the

207 ( 4 )( c) does authorize access of state's experts to conduct an examination in preparation for
any legal proceeding at which the defendant's mental condition may be at issue, the statue also
acknowledges that the defendant may nonetheless refuse to cooperate with that examination. LC.
§ 18-207(4)( e). Insofar as trial counsel believed that obtaining a report carried any risk that Mr.

Ciccone could be forced to participate in an evaluation by Dr. Estess, counsel was simply
mistaken.
Contrary to the State's arguments, Mr. Ciccone did establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that trial counsel was deficient insofar as he decided not to obtain a written evaluation
and submit it as mitigation in sentencing based upon mistakes of fact and law.
C. Mr. Ciccone Established by a Preponderance of the Evidence that Trial
Counsel's Deficient Performance was Prejudicial
To establish prejudice, Mr. Ciccone had to establish a reasonable probability that but for
counsel's deficiency the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v.

Washington, supra. To carry this burden Mr. Ciccone offered Dr. Beaver's affidavit which noted
the significant mental illness component related to the events surrounding the deaths and which
averred that a written opinion "may very well have led the Court to a sentence other than fixedlife." Petitioner's Ex. B, pp. 2-3. The State presented no evidence to rebut this. Rather, it now
argues on appeal that any written report "would have contained extremely damaging
information" and thus Mr. Ciccone has not shown prejudice.
The State's speculation as to what would have been in a written report is without support
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in the record. But, equally importantly, the State's argument ignores the applicable law. A fixed
sentence is not to be imposed except when there is '·certainty that the nature of the crime
demands incarceration until the perpetrator dies in prison, or certainty that the perpetrator never,
at any time in his life, could be safely released." State v. Jackson. 130 Idaho 293, 294-95, 939
P.2d 1372, 1373-74 (1997), quoting State v. Eubank. 114 ldaho 635,638, 750 P.2d 926,929 (Ct.
App. 1988).
Mr. Ciccone did establish a reasonable probability that had the sentencing court been
aware of the role of mental illness in the offense, it would not have sentenced him to a fixed life
term. An offense in which the existence of mental illness played a significant role is not an
offense that a court can say with certainty by its nature demands incarceration for the rest of the
defendant's life. See Stale v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 876 P.2d 158 (Ct. App. 1994), vacating
a life sentence with a minimum fixed term of ten years in a brutal stabbing death case wherein
the district court failed to obtain a psychological evaluation despite evidence that McFarland had
some sort of mental disability. See also, State v. French, 95 Idaho 853, 522 P.2d 61 (1974),
vacating a 25-year sentence for rape, holding that "the omission of [a psychological evaluation]
in this case deprived the district court of pertinent information essential to pronouncing an
appropriate judgment." Id., at 855, 522 P.2d at 63.
Likewise, there is a reasonable probability that had the court received a written report
from Dr. Beaver, which as the doctor averred may have altered the sentence, the court would
have concluded that it could not be certain that Mr. Ciccone can never at any time in his life be
safely released from prison. It is reasonably probable that had the court understood the nature of
tv1r. Ciccone's mental illness it would have concluded that a lesser sentence v.rhich allo\vcd
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from prison, if and when Mr. Ciccone's mental illness either abates or is successfully
is sufficient to meet the Toohil/2 standards for reasonability

protection of society,

deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Brief and above, Mr. Ciccone asks this Court to
reverse the order denying post-conviction relief and remand with instructions to grant relief.

/1t!-

Respectfully submitted this "1_ day of January, 2016.

~d_Jjljf--..----

Deborah Whipple
Attorney for Albert Ci
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State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,650 P.2d 707 (Ct. App. 1982).
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